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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

------VILATH B. MCDONALD and
EVELYN BROUGH,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.
BARTON BROTHERS INVESTMENT
CORPORATION,

BRIEF OF THIRD-PARTY
PLAINTIFF BARTON BROTHERS
INVESTMENT CORPORATION,
RESPONDENT

Third-Party PlaintiffRespondent,
vs.
GOLDEN WEST DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, INC., and
L. A. CAMPBELL,

Case No. 16974

Third-Party DefendantsAppellants.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This was an action by plaintiffs for specific performance
of real estate contract for two residential lots or for damages
against the defendant-third-party plaintiff who interpleaded
against third-party defendants for specific performance and/or
damages claiming that defendant-third-party plaintiff had
no obligation to provide said lots to plaintiff.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The third-party plaintiff seeks to affirm the judgment
entered against third-party defendant, L. A. Campbell.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
By Uniform Real Estate.Contract agreement dated
16 December 1970, Barton Brothers Investment Corporation
contracted to purchase from the estate of B.

o.

Brough,

deceased, approximately 22 acres of land situated in Davis
County, Utah.

(Plainti~f's

Exhibit A}.

The contract gave

Barton the option to purchase additional acreage west
of an oil pipe line:
"Buyer shall have the option of buying or refusing
to buy the acreage West of the Oil Pipe Lines
except that Seller shall have the option- of
retaining one lot West of said pipe lines,
to be adjusted in said payment due June 1, 1975."
Purchase price was $3,000.00 per acre payable June 1, 1975.
Some time in June 1974 or prior thereto, Barton met
third-party defendant, L. A. Campbell, at Tracy Collins
Bank in Bountiful, Utah and discussed Barton's land he
was purchasing from Brough.

(TR 136, 144}

Barton offered

to sell the Brough land to Campbell for $8, 500 •.-00.
(TR 89)

~an

.acre.

Barton told Campbell that plaintiffs, Violate.B.

McDonald and Evelyn Brough, had an option to purchase
two lots from the Brough property once it had been platted
and recorded and any purchase by Campbell would need to
be subject to plaintiffs' option to buy.

Campbell ac-

knowledged at trial that he was aware of Barton's obligation to plaintiff for two lots

(TR 137-138} and at that

time Campbell made arrangements to "take care of the Brough

-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sisters ... "

(TR 136-137)

An Earnest Money Receipt and

Offer to Purchase was drawn up between Barton and Campbell
dated June 7, 1974 for the sale of the subject ground
for $8,500.00 per acre.

(Defendant's Exhibit 1)

No

mention of the Brough sisters' option for two lots was
noted in defendant's exhibit 1.
On-about the 29th of July, 1974, Barton met with
the representatives of B.

o.

Brough's estate to pay the

estate the. balance due on the contract of 16 December
19.7 0.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit A)

At that closing, Jim

o.

Brough estate and ·his

Brough, representing the B.

sisters:, Violate.B. McDonald and-Evelyn Brough, .plaintiffs,
requested an instrument in writing which would reflect
the right of plaintiffs to select two lots when the land
was platted.and recorded.

Another Earnest Money Receipt

and Offer to Purchase dated July 29, 1974 (Plaintiff's·
Exhibit B) was signed by Barton as se-ller and plaintiffs
as buyer reserving to plaintiffs the option to select
two lots p:r;ovided that their s.election was made,

(1) within

10 days after the platt was re-corded with Kaysville City
~and

(2) provided there was tendered $5,000.00 for offsite

imorovements within 30 days after completion of the offsite
improvements in the subdivision immediately adjacent to
said lots on the basis of $2,500.00 per lot.

-3-
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At the time of the closing on the Brough contract,
$3,000.00 was placed in escrow for acreage adjustment
and to assure plaintiffs value for two lots if they exercised their option.

{TR 122)

Broughs conveyed the subject

land to Barton by Warranty Deed dated 15 July 1974 and
recorded 30 July 1974.

{Defendant's Exhibit 4)

Barton and Campbell met again at Tracy Collins Bank,
Bountiful, on or about August 18, 1974 to "close" the
transaction on . the sale of the ground.

Ivir. John Busk,

representing Tracy Collins Bank, prepared a closing· statement dated August 18, 1974.

{Defendant's Exhibit 2)

That closing statement under the category ·of Sales Price
showed an escrow account, 1 acre, $8,500.00.

Campbell

acknowledged (TR 98-99) tnat the purpose of the $8,500.00
escrow was " ••. held back specifically to take care of
the Brough girls."

He further said that he felt the escrow

took care of the whole situation and he felt with that
money in escrow and having bought the land for $8,500.00
per acre that they were well compensated and ahead.

Barton

also acknowledged that understanding between himself and
Campbell

(TR 154) and testified that Campbell agreed to

honor the obligation due and owing the Brough sisters.
At the time of the closing, Campbell requested that
the deed from Barton, rather than showing Campbell Construction company as the grantee as called for in the Earnest
-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase (Defendant's Exhibit
1), reflect Golden West Development Corporation as gr~ntee,
a different corporation but one in which Campbell also
held a principal interest.

The deed dated 18 July 1974

was subsequently recorded 30 July 1974.

(Defendant's

Exhibit 3)
After Barton conveyed the land to Campbell the land
was platted and recorded.

Sales cormnenced through Secure

Realty of Bountiful, an office owned and operated by Wayne
Parkin, a partner of Campbell.

Sales also were made by

Brough through his office, Brough Realty, Kaysville, ..Utah.
Mr. Brough subsequently contacted Parkin and asked
that Parkin convey two lots to plaintiffs as he, Brough,
had understood Campbell had agreed to do.

Parkin said

he did not understand fully the arrangements on the two
lots and he would discuss the matter and notify Brough.
Later Parkin told Brough that a meeting of the principal
share holders of Golden West

Dev~lopment

Corporation had

been called to discuss the matter of the Brough sisters'
two lots.

He informed Brough, " .•. it was the decision

of the corporation that we would not acknowledge any
agreement that he might or might not have entered into
with a predecessor."

(TR 130)

Campbell said that he also

informed Brough shortly thereafter in a telephone conversation:
~s-
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A.

I just told him that as far as we were
concerned, we didn't have any obligation
_on the transaction.
·_n.':t~'
gi~e

Q.

Did you
that?

him any£xplanation as to

A.

No, that's all.

{TR 139)

Campbell testified that the two lot agreement would
have been honored by himself and Golden West Development
Corporation if Barton had come to Campbell and discussed
the matter:

A.

,_.-.,.

I think Mr. Barton should have come to me when
this came to a head and tried to sit down with
with us and work a settlement out on it.
If
Mr. - Jim Brough wanted these two lots, why he
should have set down with Golden West and
worked out a negotiable price on these lots at
the time, improved lots, which we would have
done.
But, he didn't contact me.

Q.

You would have done that had Mr. Barton come
to you and said now is the time?

A.

Very definitely.
If he would have come to us,
those lots would have been open and we would
have probably worked them out. But he would
have had to compensate us for it.

Q.

And that was based upon your agreement with
him previously I take it, is that correct?

A.

Right.

Q.

But you're saying that that's why you didn't
put this thing together as you agreed to do
because he never came and sat down with you?

A.

True.

{TR 141-142)

By letter of February 4, 1977, plaintiffs made demand
on Barton for the two lots pursuant to the agreement of
-6-
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July~29,

1974 .(Plaintiff's Exhibit B) or the comparable.

value of those. lots.

.Barton. could not .. comply.

Suit was

commenced .by ... plaintiffs. shortly thereafter.
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

SINCE THE PRESENT ACTION WAS AN ACTION
IN EQUITY FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND
MONEY DAMAGES WERE AWARDED ONLY AS AN
ALTERNATIVE, THE DOCTRINE OF PART
PERFORMANCE IS AVAILABLE.
Appellant's argument that the Doctrine of Part Performance is not available in an action at law for monetary
damag~s

for breach of an oral contract to convey land,

was neither pleaded nor argued in the trial court, nor
was the court's "alternate judgment" for money damages
either formally or otherwise objected to by appellant
at the time such ruling was made.

(TR 184)

In fact,

when respondent Barton's counsel suggested that specific
performance might still be possible, Mr. Fadel, appellant's
counsel, argued against the possibility of specific performance, in favor of money damages.

(TR 190)

At no

time did appellant ever object to or express any disfavor
with the court's ruiing that money damages should be paid
as an alternative to specific performance where respondent's part performance made ineffective the operation
of the Statute of Frauds.
-7-
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-Rule 46, Utah.,. Rules of Civil Proe-edure, states that
while "Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the Court
are unnecessary," a party must, "at the time the ruling
or order of the court is made or sought, make known
to the court the action which he desires the court to
take or his objection to the action of the court and his
grounds therefore .•• "
Although appellant had ample opportunity to object
to the court's ruling against him on this issue, no where
in the transcript is there evidence that appellant ever
objected to the alternative decree of money damages or
to the use of the Doctrine of Part Performance on the
presently stated grounds.

This being the case, appellant

should not be allowed to raise such an objection on appeal.
Had appellant stated such an objection to the court
below, that court may not have given an alternate decree
for money damages, but instead

~~y

have more diligently

inquired after the possibility of specific performance,
as was suggested by respondent's counsel.

(TR 190)

Nevertheless, respondent Barton contends that appellant's first argument is invalid on its fact.
This was not an action only at law for monetary
damages as appellant claims but rather, on the face of
the pleadings as well as the ruling of the court, an action
in equity for specific performance of appellant's promise.
-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Plaintiff's Complaint prayed as follows:

1. For an Order of the Court requiring the defendan1s
to provide to the plaintiffs the lots as agreed in the
agreement.
~·

In the alternative for judgment against the defendant
in an amount equal to the present value of the lots in
question, together with interest ~1ereon at the legal
rate.
The prayer of the Third-Party Complaint was:

1. For any and all of what the plaintiffs may recover
from defendant and third-party plaintiff.
Clearly, respondent included in its Third-Party
Complaint a prayer for the same relief against appellant
as was sought against respondent by plaintiffs.

This

prayer was for specific performance, with money damages
only as an alternative.
The judgment of the Court was for specific performance,
with money damages to be awarded only in the event that
specific performance was impossible.
Section 25-5-8, U.C.A.

{TR 184)

(1953), Statute

of~Frauds,

states:
Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to abridge the powers of courts to
compel the specific performance of agreements
in case of part performance thereof.
Since the present action was for specific performance
and specific performance was granted, the doctrine of
part performance was a completely valid argument in respondent's behalf.
~9-
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The cases relied on by appeallant to establish that
part performance is not an available argument to defeat
the Statute of Frauds in an action for monetary damages
are distinguishable from the present case.

In McKinnon

v. Corporation·, Etc.·,· Latter-day Saints, 529 P. 2d 434
(Utah 1974), the action was entirely one for monetary
damages.

Specific performance was not even requested.

But in the present case, specific performance was both
prayed-for-and decreed by the court.

Only because specific

performance was "impossible" was an alternate judgment
for money damages declared at all.
In Ravatino v. Pric·e, 123 Utah 559, 260 P.2d 570
(1953), the court's statement, quoted by appellant, that
"It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the Doctrine
of Part Performance is not available in an action for
damages on an oral contract to convey land," was mere
ill-supported dictum, since the court had already reversed
the trial court's decree for specific performance on the
grounds that the alleged part performance was insufficient
to take an oral contract out of the Statute of Frauds
anyway.
In Baugh v. Darley, 112 Utah 1, 184 P.2d 335, (1947) the
Ravarino court's sole support for the "well settled"
doctrine, again the action was one at la~ only, and no
specific performance was pled or decreed, as an alternative
-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

or otherwise.
Respondent contends that the doctrine of part performance should be available in the present case, as
allowed by the court below.
POINT II
THE DOCTRINE OF PART PERFORMANCE AS
EXCLUDING THE OPERATION OF THE STATUTE
OF FRAUDS IS VERY BROAD.
Respondent reiterates part-of appellant's quote from
Ravarino v. Price, supra, comment 6:
In.Pr~ce v. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 86 P. 767,
772, 8 L.R.A., N.S., 870, (1906) this court said:

Courts of equity, in establishing the
doctrine invoked by plaintiff, have
not; by any means, intended to annul
the Statute of Frauds, but only to
prevent its being· made the means of
perpetrating a fraud ...
And in Burns v. McCormick, 233 N.Y. 230,
135 N.E. 273, 374, (1922) - the -Cou~:t of Appeals of New
York, through Mr. Justice Cardozo announced:
The peril of perjury and ~rror is
latent in the spoken promise. Such,
.at least, is the warning of the statute,
-the estimate of policy that finds expression .. in its mandate.
Thus, according to Justice Cardozo and this court,
the primary purpose for the Statute of Frauds is to avoid
the possibility of perjured testimony of oral contracts.
Yet, in the case at bar no possibility of perjury concerning the oral contract exists.

Indeed, the most favor-

-11-
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able testimony to respondent regarding the oral contract
was that given by appellant himself.

Appellant Campbell,

testified concerning the oral contract as

follo~s

(TR 136):

Q.

When did you make that agreement with him [J. Barton]?

A.

That was when we first bought it.

Q.

What date?

A•

Don't ask me, I don't keep dates in my mind that
. good.

Q.

Okay, Your Earnest Money Agreementwas in June
of '74., just to refresh yo~r memory. Was it
.-at that time?·

A.

Well, it was prior to that--I think it was prior
.to that~signing of the Earnest Money or somewhere
around that.vicinity.

Q.

I see, so some time prior to June of '74 you
made an agreement with Mr. Barton to take care
of the Brough sisters--is that what you are
saying?

A.

In that vicinity, yes.

The reason given by Justice Cardozo for invoking
the Statute of Frauds is not present in the case at bar.
But the reason for invoking the exception to the Statute
of Frauds of part performance, as quoted in

Pr~ce

v.

Lloyd, supra, is "to prevent its being made the means
of perpetrating a fraud."

The possibility of the Statute

of Frauds being used to perpetrate a fraud in the present
case compels allowing the exception.
Appellant, by his own testimony, admitted having
made an agreement with respondent to honor the option

-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of the Brough sisters.

This agreement was made to induce

respondent to sell the subdivision to appellant.

If

appellant, after admitting having made the agreement,
and after respondent had performed fully by selling the
property in relience on the promise, were then allowed
to have the promise declared invalid for the Statute.of
Frauds, this would put the Statute of Frauds to the very
use it was intended to prevent.
Appellant's claim that there was no clear oral agreement is aiso entirely unsupported by the evidence.

We

quote from Campbell's testimony on page. 14L! of the Trial
Transcript, .lines 4-12:

Q.

Did you ever have any conversation with Mr.
Jake Barton relative to an agreement which
he had with the Brough sisters?

A.

Yes.
I had this previous negotiation with
him at the very first when he said that he
had this obligation.

Q.

Did he represent to you that in fact he felt
. that he had a right to those two lots?

A.

Oh, very definitely. He asked me if I would,
you_. know, if I would acknowledge this and I
told him that dovm the road we would work it
out. -

Barton testified that the agreement was in fact worked
out "in quite minute detail prior to going into closing."
(TR

162)
The trial court, in its Formal ?indings of Fact,

paragraph 16, accepted the foregoing testimony to the
-13-
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effect that appellant, Mr. Campbell, verbally agreed to
honor the agreement with the Brough sisters.
Finally, appellant subtitled his second argument
by claiming that "The Doctrine of Part Performances as
Excluding the Operation of the Statute of Frauds is Extremely
Limited."

We reiterate 25-5-8, U.C.A.

(1953), Statute:,of.

Frauds, which states, "nothing in this chapter contained
shall be construed to abridge the powers of courts to
compel the specific performance of agreements in case
of part performance thereof."

The language of the statute

makes very plain the desire of the legislature that the
doctrine of part performance is to have a very broad
application.

Appellant has cited no case law which defeats

the language of this statute, particularly as applied
to the facts of the present case, where respondent's
part of the agreement was fully performed, the oral agreement was admitted by

appellant~

specific performance was

decreed by the court, and a failure to follow the statute
would allow appellant to perpetrate a fraud.
POINT III
APPELLANT'S ORAL PROMISE TO HONOR
PLAINTIFFS' OPTION FOR TNO LOTS WAS
PART OF THE ORIGINAL CONSIDERATION
FOR THE SALE OF THE SUBDIVISION BY
RESPONDENT TO APPELLANT.
Viewing appellant Campbell's own testimony most
~14-
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favorably, the oral agreement came, not "on or after July 30,
1974," ·b\lt "at the very first"
bought it"

(TR 144) "when we first

(TR 136), prior to the Earnest Money Agreement

(TR 136), or "sometime prior to June of '74"

(TR 136).

The record shows that Campbell was very certain in his
own mind that·he had made an agreement with and was obligated
to Barton concerning the Brough lots when he first bought
the subdivision from Barton.

In fact, Campbell stated

that, based on this he would have made a settlement honoring
the agreement if only Barton had taken the initiative
by contacting Campbell.

(TR 141)

Thus, Campbell's agreement to honor the Brough option
was part of the original consideration for the subdivision
sold by Barton to Campbell.

Barton would not have sold

the property, had Campbell not agreed to honor the Brough
option.

And this was clearly the reason-Campbell agreed

"when we first bought it"

(TR 136) to "work something

out."
This was the view accepted by the trial court (Formal
Findings of Fact, paragraph 14), which further found that
Barton's obligation on this oral contract was fully performed (Formal Findings of Fact, paragraph 14), which
performance consisted of the sale and transfer of title
of the land to Campbell.
Appellant's cost analysis is completely irrelevant,
..:.1s-
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since Campbell, had he honored the Brough option, would
have gotten exactly what he bargained for. , Again, Campbell,
by his own admission, agreed to deliver the two lots to
the Brough sisters, should they so choose.

By not honoring

that agreement, Campbell left himself with a windfall-property worth much more than the $8,500.00 in escrow.
POINT IV
THE PRESENT ACTION·IS ONE IN EQUITY FOR
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, AND THIS IS THE
RELIEF WHICH WAS GRANTED; IN ANY EVENT,
RESPONDENT SHOULD NOT BE WITHOUT A REME.DY
MERELY BECAUSE OF THE WAY PLAINTIFFS
APPROACHED AND PLEADED THE CASE.
The trial court ruled that "plaintiffs were not
required to pre-pay the FIVE THOUSAND

($5,000.00) DOLLARS

for improvements where the defendant refused to convey
the lots in question."

(Conclusions of Law, paragraph

3)
Respondent respectfully submits that, were this court
to reverse the trail court's ruling on this point with
respect to appellant, the entire decision of the trial
court should also be reversed with respect to respondent.
For, if the plaintiffs were not excused from tendering
the $5,000.00 to Barton, then Barton should not be required
to perform his part of the contract with plaintiffs.
Nevertheless, appellant contends that plaintiffs'
failure to tender the $5,000.00 shows that plaintiffs
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never intended to obtain specific performance, and

t

ri. it

the action was a legal action for damages, thereby precluding part performance as a basis for respondent's ThirdParty Complaint..

This contention is inapplicable to the

present situation.
It should be pointed out that respondent is in a
difficult situation regarding the technical distinction
between actions at law and equity.

The present case has

involved two lawsuits, one by plaintiff against respondent,
and the other by respondent against appellants.

In the

latter suit, respondent may only recover, at most, what
plaintiff recovered from respondent in the former suit.
But respondent is handcuffed in the latter suit by the
plaintiffs' pleadings in the former sui.t.

Thus, had the

plaintiffs chosen only to seek monetary damages from
respondent in an action at law, respondent could not then
seek specific performance against appellant in his ThirdParty Complaint.
Appellant would have the court believe that because
this court in past

cases_has~refused

to allow use of the

doctrine of part performance in an action at law, under
very different fact situations, respondent should then
be without remedy, merely because plaintiffs chose not
to,seek specific performance.
Respondent contends that:

(1)

the;,.'present case is

~17-
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an action in equity;

(2) the relief granted by the court

was specific performance, an equitable relief; and (3)
even if this court should find the opposite on both of
these issues, the Doctrine of Part Performance should
be allowed to defeat the Statute of Frauds on the unique
facts of the present case.
POINT V
THE ORAL PROMISE MADE BY APPELLANT
WAS NOT A MODIFICATION OF, BUT A
PART OF THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT, AND
THERE ARE SUFFICIENT MEMORANDA TO
TAKE THE ORAL PROMISE OUT OF THE
STATUTE OF FRAUDS ANYWAY.
Appellant's argument that a contract required to
be in writing cannot be modified by an oral agreement
is invalid for the following reasons:
First, as was discussed above, Campbell's promise
to honor the Brough option was part of the original contract
between Campbell and Barton.
Second, both appellant's biief and the evidence were
ambiguous as to what particular written instrument embodies
the entire contract.

And even were Campbell's promise

deemed a modification of some written contract, the court
in Zions Properties, Tnc.

v.

Holt, 538 P.2d 1319 (1975),

as quoted by appellant, pointed out that the statute of
frands applied equally to modifications of contracts as
well as to original contracts.

It follows that the ex-
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ceptions to the statute of frauds should apply to mod if j c.1tions also.

Thus, in the present case, whether or not

Campbell's agreement is deemed a modification to or part
of the original contract, Barton's obligations thereunder
were fully performed, and the doctrine of part performance
takes it out . of .. the . Statute of Frauds.
Third, the memoranda of the oral agreement are much
more

~bundant

in the case at bar than in Zions.

There,

notations on a check were the only concrete evidence of
the oral agreement.

Here, both the written memoranda

and oral evidence are more than adequate to concretely
establish the oral contract.

The closing statement prepared

by Mr. Busk of Tracy Collins Bank mentions the $8,500.00
held in escrow for one acre, to allow for the Brough lots.
(Defendant's Exhibit 2)

Campbell's deposition and testi-

mony shows that he knew what the $8,500.00 was for and
did not object to its being withheld at the time of closing.
The Earnest Money Agreement (Defendant's Exhibit
1), signed by Campbell, specified the purchase price of
the property at $8,500.00 per acre, which agrees with
and further supports the escrow agreement.
The Tracy Mortgage Company check stub (Plaintiff's
Exhibit C) also mentions a deduction for-·" 2/3 acre in
2 lots being repurchased."
And finally, .Mr. Campbell himself testified of his
.-19-
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oral

agre~ment

to assume Barton's obligation to the Brough

sisters •.
There can be no question that the oral contract
eXi$ted, ,:.and the evidence establishes it clearly enough to
easily satisfy the Statute of Frauds.
POINT VI
APPELLANT'S ORAL PROMISE MUST BE DEEMED
AN ORIGINAL OBLIGATION AND NEED NOT BE
IN WRITING.
Section 25-5-6, U.C.A.

(1953), Statute of

states in pertinent part:
A promise to answer for the obligation of
.another in any of the following cases is
deemed an original obligation of the
promiser and need not be in writing:
(1)
Where the promise is made b-y one who has
received property of another upon an undertaking
to apply it pursuant to such promise, or -cby one
who ::has received a dischar<Je-- from an. obligation
in whole or in part in.considE!£ation of such.
promise.
The only case law

v.

applicabl~

to this statute is Kahn

Perry Zolezzi, Inc., 119 Utah 256, 226 P.2d 118 (1950),

where the defendant corporation agreed to assume an obliga11,fl'

tion of one of. the incorporators
on a note upon receiving
.
'

'

~

\'

-~

,...

property from the incorporator equal to the amount of
the note.

In holding that the defendant corporation was

bound to its agreement under §25-5-6 U.C.A (1953), this
court said:

-20-
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So concluding, i t is not necc':>sary to determine
whether or not there is sufficient memoranda in
writing of the agreement of the corporate defendant
to take the case from the Statute of Frauds.
In the case at bar, Campbell, the promiser, received
property f rorn Barton upon undertaking to apply the property
in answering for Barton's obligation to the Brough sisters.
This is a situation clearly within the meaning of Section
25-5-6.

The equities of the present case are also clearly

deserving of the application of Section 25-5-6 in upholding
the trial court's decision.

Campbell's promise should

be deemed an original obliation and need not be in writing.
POINT VII
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT APPLY TO AN
ACTION FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF A
CONTRACT WEICH HAS BEEN PARTLY PERFORMED.
The present case also falls under Section 25-5-8,
U.C.A.

(1953), Statute of Frauds, which states that:

Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to abridge the powers of courts to compel
the specific performance of _agreements in case of
part performance thereof.
As has been discussed above, the present case is
among those intended to be reached by this statute.
POINT VIII
THIS COURT HAS TENDED TO BE PARTICULARLY
\'JILLING TO ALLOW AN ORAL CONTRACT TO STlu-m
WHERE ITS EXISTE1JCE IS iill~lITTED BY THE PARTY
AGAINST WHrn-1 IT IS BE n;G EHFORCED.
In In re Roth's Estate, 2 Utah

2c

40, 269 P.2d 278, (1954}

-21-
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in an action between two remainderman to have property
sold and proceeds divided, defendant counterclaimed for
specific performance of an oral agreement by plaintiff
to sell his interest to defendant. Plaintiff-appellant
contended that no oral contract existed, but his own
testimony showed that an agreement did exist.

In granting

specific performance to defendant, this court stated:
... we think that inasmuch as the appellant's
own testimony establishes an oral agreement
on his part to sell his interest in the
property to his brother we are warranted in
concluding that the acts of part performance
were done in relience on that contract. In
J o·ne s v. Jon e·s , 3 3 3 Mo . 4 7 8 , 6 3 S . W. 2d 14 6 ,
90 A. L. R. 219, (1933). arid iI). Higgins· v •. _Exchange
Nat. Bank, 142 Misc. 69, 253 N.Y.S.- 859., (1931)
was held that where the existence of the
oral contract is established by an admission
of the party resisting specific performance
or by competent evidence independent of the
acts of part performance1 the requirement
that the acts of pa_rt performance must be
exclusive referable to the oral contract is
satisfied.
Corbin on Contracts, Sec. 430,
approves the holding of" those cases.
Even should this court find the written memoranda
establishing an oral contract to be not quite sufficient
to satisfy the .Statute of Frauds, the fact that appellant
himself testified as to the oral contract should allow
the court to find in favor of respondent.

-22-
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CONCLUSION
Campbell, from the beginning of his negotiations
with Barton was aware of the obligation to the Brough
sisters and agreed to assume that obligation.

The memo-

randa of the parties to the sale of the land substantiate
and verify the details of that agreement and therefore
remove this case from the Statute of Frauds relating to
the transfer .. of real property.

Additionally the statutes

of the State of Utah specifically lift this case from
the defense of Statute of Frauds and the decision of the
trial court should be affirmed.
DATED this

/

L/}-day

of June, 19 80.
BEAN, BEAN & SMEDLEY

'

STANLEY M SMED
Attorney for Third-Party
Plain iff-Respondent
190 South Fort Lane, Suite 2
Layton, Utah 84041
Telephone:
376-4221
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL

/.CZtf day

I certify that on this

of June, 1980, I

served a copy of the foregoing Brief of Third-Party
Plaintiff, Barton Brothers Investment Corporation, on
George K. Fadel, Attorney for Third-Party Defendant,
170 West Fourth South, Bountiful, Utah
Rodney

s.

84010 and to

Page, Attorney for Plaintiffs, 40 South 125

East, Clearfield, Utah

84015, by mailing said copy to

said attorneys, postage prepaid.
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